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00Military Personnel Policy:
Who's in Charge? The courts, congress or
the commander in chief?.
By William A. Woodruff
I. Introduction
The ongoing debate over the
military's homosexual policy has
produced conflicting signals from the
three branches of government over
establishing and administering
military policy. President Clinton
declared that a policy that
discriminated on the basis of sexual
orientation was wrong and vowed to
lift the ban. At the same time, senior
uniformed leaders of the military,
who are also part of the executive
branch, defended the ban. Members of
Congress have come down strongly
on both sides of the issue. Judicial
decisions in recent years both
affirmed and condemned the policy.1
The homosexual policy that
triggered the debate is embodied in a
Department of Defense directive
promulgated by the Secretary of
Defense. As commander in chief, the
President certainly has a
constitutional role in military policy.
The Constitution also gives
Congress significant power and
responsibility over military matters.
Indeed, article I, section 8 of the
Constitution contains an impressive
list of military powers and
responsibilities vested specifically in
the Congress. If fact, the Department
of Defense directive at the center of
the current debate was promulgated
pursuant to a Congressional grant of
authority to the Secretary of Defense
to establish enlistment criteria.
While article III of the Constitution
does not specifically mention the
military or give any military powers
directly to the judiciary, the principle
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of judicial review does bring the
judiciary into the mix. Recent
decisions by district courts in
California overturning discharges of
homosexual sailors 2 indicates the
willingness of at least some judges to
become involved in military policy.
But who is really in charge? Which
branch of government, after resolving
internal disagreements, gets to make
the final decision? When the courts,
the commander in chief, and the
Congress all claim a role in running
the military, who gets the last word?
This article will briefly explore these
questions in the context of the debate
over the homosexual exclusion policy.
II. The Role of the Courts
Despite some ambiguity early in
our nation's history, it is now well-
settled that the courts have the power
to review military policies, programs,
and activities. In one sense, therefore,
the answer to the question posed
above is that the courts will have the
last word. Merely acknowledging the
fact that courts can review military
decisions, however, does not
determine the degree to which a court
may substitute its judgment for that of
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ark. Law. 46 1993
the political branches in matters
involving the military. Both Congress
and the courts have developed
restraining 3 devices to preclude
judges from becoming too deeply
involved in military affairs. 3
Ultimately, the question is to what
extent may a judge second-guess
policy decisions of the executive and
legislative branches in reviewing
challenges to military policies.
The Supreme Court has compiled a
long and consistent record of granting
considerable deference to the political
branches in military policy disputes.
Over 100 years ago, the Court
recognized the unique nature of the
military:
An army is not a deliberative
body. It is the executive arm. Its law
is that of obedience. No question can
be left open as to the right to
command in the officer, or the duty
of obedience in the soldier. Vigor
and efficiency on the part of the
officer and confidence among the
soldiers in one another are impaired
if any question be left open as to
their attitude to each other.4
More recently, the Court noted
that "judges are not given the task of
running the Army . . . ; [olrderly
government requires that the judiciary
be ... scrupulous not to interfere with
legitimate Army matters . .. .5
Furthermore, the Court has
acknowledged that federal judges are
"ill-equipped to determine the impact
upon discipline that any particular
intrusion upon military authority
might have." 6
Goldman v. Weinberger,7 a case
pitting military uniform regulations
against an Orthodox Jewish rabbi's
First Amendment free exercise rights,
illustrates the degree of deference the
Court has determined must be
granted to military policy makers.
Simcha Goldman was an Air Force
clinical psychologist and an ordained
Jewish rabbi. In observance of his
religious faith, he routinely wore an
unobtrusive yarmulke while indoors
in uniform. Air Force regulations,
however, precluded the wear of any
headgear except as authorized by the
Air Force regulations. The regulations
did not permit the routine wear of a
yarmulke. Goldman challenged the
regulations as violating the Free
Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Goldman argued that
wearing the unobtrusive yarmulke
did not present a danger to military
discipline or esprit de corps. He
claimed the Air Force's assertion to
the contrary had no support in actual
experience or scientific study. In fact,
he offered expert testimony that
accommodating religious practices
such as his would actually improve
morale within the military and further
the goals underlying the uniform
regulations.
In rejecting Goldman's challenge,
the Court noted that soldiers do not
leave their Constitutional rights at
home when they join the military, but
the unique nature of military service
and the requirement for discipline and
obedience necessitates a review that is
"far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws
or regulations designed for civilian
society." 8 Even if the policies are
based upon "professional military
judgment," as oppc9ed to scientific
studies, this deferential review
applies:
But whether or not expert witnesses
may feel that. . . exceptions to . . .
[the military policy] are desirable is
quite beside the point. The
desirability of. . . regulations in the
military is decided by the appropriate
military officials, and they are under no
constitutional mandate to abandon
their considered professional judgment.9
Though criticized, 10 Goldman
clearly teaches that courts must grant
considerable deference to military
policy makers, even when the policy
at issue impinges upon rights
specifically protected by the
Constitution. Applying this principle
to challenges to the homosexual
policy leads to the conclusion that
courts called upon to review the
policy must be prepared to defer to
"considered professional judgment"
even when plaintiffs argue that expert
studies do not support the policy. If
the military's interest in having
everyone wear the same clothes is
sufficient to overcome the long-
cherished and specifically enshrined
right to the free exercise of religion,
certainly the military's interest in unit
cohesion and combat effectiveness is
sufficient to overcome any particular
group's desire to serve, whether they
be single parents, high school drop
outs, those who do not meet height,
weight, or other physical standards,
or homosexuals.
III. The Role of the Political Branches
Taken as a whole, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence concerning the
review of military policies reveals that
the courts are not charged with
determining military policy. While a
federal court is a particularly
inappropriate forum to decide
questions of force composition and
service qualifications, the Legislative
and Executive branches are
specifically charged with
responsibility for the military and
national defense. 11 The political
branches, unlike the courts, are
susceptible to lobbying efforts,
political pressure from interests
groups and constituents, and worries
over reelection. But such is the nature
of the democratic process.
Unlike the judiciary, the political
branches are not required to give
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deference to the decisions of military
commanders. Both the President and
the Congress may choose to accept
the advice and recommendations of
military leaders on matters effecting
the Armed Forces, but they are under
no constitutional command to defer to
the judgment of uniformed military
leaders. This principle of civilian
control changes the nature of the
debate when the forum is the political
arena rather than the courtroom.
Instead of arguing over the standard
of review that a court should employ
or debating the degree of deference
that a judge should give to a
commander's military decision, the
debate in the political arena can center
on the underlying merits of the policy
at issue.
Recognizing that the political
branches have the authority and
responsibility to decide the issue is
only part of the analysis. Considering
the allocation of authority and
responsibility between the Executive
and Legislative branches is another
question.
A. The Executive
As "Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several states,
when called into actual service of the
United States,' 12 the Constitution
certainly gives the President some
authority over the military. The
delegates to the Constitutional
I Convention, who wrestled with the
I difficult issues of allocation of military
power in a central government, were
familiar with the role of a commander
in chief. They fully understood that it
was the senior position in the military
chain of command and carried with it
significant power. Their recent
experience with the British and
European systems, however, made
them wary of placing too much
military power in one office. While the
British king was also the commander
in chief of the British forces, the office
created by the Constitution was
"'nominally the same," . . . [but] 'in
substance much inferior,' amounting
'to nothing more than supreme
command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first
general and admiral ... "13
While possessing the "supreme
command and direction" of the armed
forces is an impressive phrase, it does
little to delineate the precise military
powers vested in the President.
Clearly, however, the President does
1 not have the relatively unchecked
1 military powers of an 18th century
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European monarch. In reality, the
extent of the President's military
authority is determined by the
political process.
Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co. v. Sawyer14 has become the classic
statement concerning the scope of
executive authority. In reversing
President Truman's exercise of his
commander in chief powers to direct
the Secretary of Commerce to seize
the nation's steel mills in an effort to
prevent a labor dispute from
disrupting production needed to
support the war effort in Korea,
Justice Jackson set forth a three-tiered
paradigm of presidential power:
1. When the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can
delegate....
2. When the President acts in absence
of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely
upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress have current
authority, or in which its distribution
is uncertain...
3. When the President takes
measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter... 15
Under Jackson's formulation,
determining the scope of presidential
power requires considering what
authority Congress has in the area and
how it has been implemented, if at all.
While the President certainly has
authority to establish military
personnel policies, the real question is
whether Congress agrees or
acquiesces in the policy. If so, and
subject to a very deferential standard
of judicial review, there is no question
as to authority. If not, the struggle
then becomes one of the political will
of the President on one hand and the
Congress on the other.
B. The Legislature
The military powers specifically
granted by the Constitution to the
Congress far exceed those specifically
granted to the President. Article I,
section 8, of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power, among others, to
"provide for the common defense," to
"declare war," to "raise and support
armies," to "provide and maintain a
navy," to "make rules for the
government and regulation of the
land and naval forces," and the power
to "make all laws ... necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers." 16
In exercising its constitutional
authority, Congress has granted the
President and the Secretaries of the
military departments statutory
authority to promulgate regulations
governing various aspects of military
life and operations. While the
President's title of commander in chief
carries with it the inherent power to
establish rules and policies governing
the military, as commander in chief he
is, in effect, part of the "land and
naval forces" over which Congress is
authorized to govern and regulate. As
the chief executive, of course, the
President can veto any rule that
Congress passes. If he has the votes to
sustain the veto, then his power as
chief executive prevails over the
congressional power to make the rules
and regulations governing the armed
forces. If Congress overrides the veto,
then the President, both as the chief
executive with the obligation to
faithfully execute the law and as the
senior commander in the armed
forces, has the duty to comply with
the valid exercise of congressional
authority.
In the context of the debate over
the homosexual policy, it is clear that
the President can, by executive order
or through departmental directives,
rescind the homosexual policy and
establish a different policy. It is
equally clear that any statutory
provision passed by Congress and
signed into law by the President or
enacted over his veto will trump any
executive order or departmental
directive.
IV. Resolving the Debate
On July 19, 1993, the President
announced a new homosexual policy
that purported to end discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.
While less than what homosexual
activists had hoped for, the new
policy declared that sexual orientation
was not a bar to service, but continued
the practice of discharging those who
engage in homosexual acts, who enter
into homosexual marriages, or who
claim to be homosexual. Because the
previous policy did not define,
mention, or consider sexual
orientation apart from sexual conduct,
the new policy actually creates an
orientation-conduct dichotomy and
declares that orientation is not a bar to
service. Essentially, the President's
July 19, 1993, policy is based upon the
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notion that sexual orientation is
unrelated to sexual behavior. The
President's policy also placed certain
restrictions on a commander's
authority to investigate allegations of
homosexuality among members of the
unit and contemplated the issuance of
detailed investigatory guidance.
In hearings before the Senate
Armed Services Committee and a
subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee, senior
Department of Defense officials
explained that the new policy was
basically the same as the previous
policy with only minor exceptions.
The creation of the orientation-
conduct dichotomy and the
investigatory restrictions in the
President's policy, however, caused
some concern. Despite assurances
from administration officials that the
new policy was essentially the same
as the previous policy, both the House
and Senate Armed Services
Committees approved amendments to
the Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 that will, in effect,
codify the policy that has been in
place since 1981. The statutory
language retains the discharge criteria
as it existed under the previous
policy, does not place limits on a
commander's discretion to investigate
matters that may effect unit morale,
cohesion, and discipline, and does not
contain the notion that sexual
orientation is not linked to sexual
conduct.16 Attempts during floor
debate to amend the Senate bill and
specifically defer to the discretion of
the President were defeated.
Assuming that the pending legislation
is passed and signed by the President,
the homosexual exclusion policy will
become a statutory condition on
service, enacted pursuant to Congress'
power under article I, section 8, of the
Constitution.
Obviously, enacting the
homosexual exclusion policy into law,
rather than leaving it to the discretion
of the President or the Secretary of
Defense, reduces the authority of the
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Executive to alter or amend the policy
in the future. Once Congress has
exercised its constitutional authority
to make the "rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval
forces," the President's discretion is
limited. He must faithfully execute the
law. The codification of the
homosexual exclusion policy also
effects the scope of judicial review.
The extensive hearings before both the
Senate Armed Services Committee
and the House Armed Services
Committee produced an impressive
body of evidence to support the
legislative findings contained in the
statute. When signed into law, the
statute will contain the congressional
finding, based upon extensive
hearings, that the "presence in the
armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts would
create an unacceptable risk to the high
standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion, that are
the essence of military capability."17
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Royster v. Goldberg.18 In 1973, after
establishing an all-volunteer armed
forces, President Nixon ended the
requirement for 18-year-old males to
register for the draft. After the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, however,
President Carter determined that
reactivation of the registration process
was necessary. Accordingly, he asked
Conbress to transfer funds from the
Department of Defense budget to the
Selective Service System. The
President also asked Congress to
amend the Military Selective Service
Act to register women for the draft as
well as men.
Congress agreed that reactivating
the registration process was
appropriate. After extensive hearings,
debate, and deliberation, however,
Congress declined to provide for the
registration of women and transferred
only enough funds to provide for the
registration of men.
Several male plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of the all-male
draft. The Supreme Court held that
the male-only draft did not violate
equal protection principles. Central to
its conclusion was the fact that
Congress was exercising its
constitutional authority over the
Armed Forces and that its decision
was reached after careful
consideration of the alternatives. The
Court noted that "judicial deference..
.is at its apogee when legislative
action under the congressional
authority to raise and support armies
and make rules and regulations for
their governance is challenged." 19
No doubt there will be judicial
challenges to any statutory limitation
on service by homosexuals. But the
combination of executive and
legislative authority that a statutory
provision requires creates a
formidable barrier that will not be
easily breached. The very text of the
Constitution commits this matter to
Congiess. In an exercise of this
constitutional responsibility, Congress
carefully and deliberately considered
the issue. Committees in both houses
conducted extensive hearings and
heard testimony from differing
viewpoints. In the final analysis, the
body charged with the power to raise
armies and given the duty to make the
rules to govern the military decided
that the presence in the armed forces
of individuals who engage in or who
have the propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts would
create an unacceptable risk to the high
standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are
the essence of military capability.
Goldman, Royster, and a long line of
Supreme Court decisions teach that
courts must defer to such judgments.
While the courts must defer to
Congress on such issue, there is no
requirement that those with opposing
views do so. The exercise of
congressional authority over the
military on this or other matters does
not carry with it the finality principles
that apply to judicial decisions.
Congress has taken action to preserve
a policy that military judgment and
experience holds is necessary to
maintain the effectiveness of our
armed forces. In this regard, the
debate is over and the question has
been decided. Congress had the last
word. It would be naive, however, to
think that the issue will go away. In
some respects, the battle is just
beginning.
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